Study on Green Supply Chain Decisions under Different Power Structures

Yonglong Wang; Xinyu Zheng; Jirong Cai

doi:10.62051/ajmse.v1n3.06

Authors

Yonglong Wang School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China
Xinyu Zheng School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China
Jirong Cai School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ajmse.v1n3.06

Keywords:

Green Supply Chain, Different Power Structures, Decision-making Behaviors

Abstract

This paper investigates decision-making issues of green supply chains under alternative power structures. Assuming that the manufacturer and two retailers are fully rational and risk-neutral decision-makers, three game-theoretic models are established corresponding to manufacturer-led dominance, retailer-led dominance and balanced bilateral power, whose equilibrium solutions are derived analytically. Comparative analysis and numerical simulation of the three game models are implemented to identify the impacts of disparate power structures on the decision-making behaviors and profits of upstream and downstream enterprises within the supply chain. The results reveal that the effects of power structures on green technology investment, order quantity and supply chain members’ profits are predominantly contingent on consumers’ green preference coefficient and the impact coefficient of green technology investment on wholesale price.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

[1] Lin, Z., & Wu, Q. (2023). A pricing strategy of green supply chain based on stochastic reference prices. Industrial Engineering Journal, 26(2), 12–19+30. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2023.02.002.

[2] Zheng, X., Govindan, K., & Deng, Q. (2019). Effects of design for the environment on firms’ production and remanufacturing strategies. International Journal of Production Economics, 213, 217–228. https://doi.org/10. 1016/ j. ijpe.2019.02.015.

[3] Raz, G., Druehl, C. T., & Blass, V. (2013). Design for the environment: Life‐cycle approach using a newsvendor model. Production and Operations Management, 22(4), 940–957. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12011.

[4] Lin, M., Liu, Y., & Fu, Q. (2022). Green supply chain decisions with consideration of tariffs, power structures and consumer preference. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 30(03), 131–141. https://doi.org/ 10.16381/ j.cnki. issn1003-207x.2020.2249.

[5] El-Ansary, A. I., & Stern, L. W. (1972). Power measurement in the distribution channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 9(1), 47–52. https://doi.org/10.2307/3149605.

[6] Shi, R., Zhang, J., & Ru, J. (2013). Impacts of power structure on supply chains with uncertain demand. Production and Operations Management, 22(5), 1232–1249. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12002.

[7] Wang, J. C., Wang, Y. Y., & Lai, F. (2019). Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus. International Transactions in Operational Research, 26(5), 1752–1785. https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12466.

[8] Feng, C., Li, L., & Fang, X. (2018). Impacts of power structure on supply chain with random yield. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 24(06), 1542–1553. https://doi.org/10.13196/j.cims.2018.06.023.

[9] Yao, F., Tan, Q., & Li, T. (2025). Green design and pricing decisions of supply chain considering altruistic preference under asymmetric information. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 31(3), 1070–1084. https:// doi.org/10.13196/j.cims.2022.0714.

[10] Huang, D., & Zhang, J. (2021). The impacts of carbon tax on emissions abatement level in a supply chain under different power structures. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 29(07), 57–70. https://doi.org/10.16381/ j.cnki. issn1003-207x.2018.1761.

[11] Du, P., Yang, X., Xu, L., et al. (2020). Green design strategies of competing manufacturers in a sustainable supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production, 265, 121853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.121853.

[12] Yoshihara, R., & Matsubayashi, N. (2021). Channel coordination between manufacturers and competing retailers with fairness concerns. European Journal of Operational Research, 290(2), 546–555. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ejor.2020.08.023.

[13] Shi, X., Dong, C., Zhang, C., et al. (2019). Who should invest in clean technologies in a supply chain with competition? Journal of Cleaner Production, 215, 689–700. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.072.

[14] Wu, T., Zhang, L. G., & Ge, T. (2019). Managing financing risk in capacity investment under green supply chain competition. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 143, 37–44. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j. techfore. 2019. 03. 005.

[15] Ma, P., Wang, H., & Shang, J. (2013). Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand. International Journal of Production Economics, 144(2), 572–581. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/ j.ijpe. 2013. 04.020.

[16] Murali, K., Lim, M. K., & Petruzzi, N. C. (2019). The effects of ecolabels and environmental regulation on green product development. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 21(3), 519–535. https://doi. org/10. 1287/ msom.2017.0703.

[17] Chaab, J., & Rasti-Barzoki, M. (2016). Cooperative advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain with a general demand function; A game-theoretic approach. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 99, 112–123. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2016.07.007.

[18] Jafari, H., Hejazi, S. R., & Rasti-Barzoki, M. (2017). Sustainable development by waste recycling under a three-echelon supply chain: A game-theoretic approach. Journal of Cleaner Production, 142, 2252–2261. https:// doi. org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.11.051.